A regular briefing for the alternative asset management industry.
Subscription line financing has been around for decades. It began as the solution to a problem: investors wanted a more regular drawdown cycle from their sponsors, and the sponsors needed to be able to access cash at short notice to do deals. The obvious answer was that a lender – usually a bank keen to cement its presence in the more lucrative leverage finance market – would provide a bridging loan. The lender would provide short term liquidity at relatively low rates of interest against the (excellent) security of the LPs' undrawn capital. On the next regular drawdown date, capital would be called from investors to repay the loan.
As the industry has grown in the intervening years, subscription line financing – in common with other fund financing tools – has become ubiquitous. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, drafted after the global financial crisis in 2007/8, even includes a carve out for sub lines from its fund leverage calculations.
As usage further increased during a period of very low interest rates, some investors became concerned that the financing tool was being over-used, and borrowings left outstanding for too long. This had the effect of increasing risk – and could magnify fund returns to make it easier for sponsors to jump the hurdle that triggers carried interest entitlements. This impact can be over-stated, as various studies, including analysis by Blackrock, has shown. Nevertheless, the investors' industry association, ILPA, issued some guidelines in 2017, updated in 2020, intended to set some parameters for sub line use and recommended enhanced disclosures.
But now there is another problem. While demand for subscription line financing has not abated, supply has slowed.
Pressure on banks' balance sheets has led many to scale back their exposure to subscription lines. For example, in 2022 Citi was reported to have scaled back its lending by over two-thirds in response to more demanding capital adequacy requirements. Rising interest rates and the failure of SVB, First Republic and Signature Bank – all of which were active in the fund finance space – have exacerbated the problem.