Previously, companies using "dual class" share structures, which assist founder directors to maintain control of a company post-listing, were only able to list on the standard listing segment: for example, THG, Deliveroo, Oxford Nanopore and S4 Capital (listings with which Travers Smith was involved) make use of such a structure.
The rule changes allow for certain limited dual class structures to be listed on the premium segment of the main market. This will enable a company with a dual class structure, at least currently, to be included for the first time in market indices such as the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. This is significant, as passive investors invest in such companies on these indices indirectly through tracker funds.
However, there are some important caveats to the approved dual class share structure change:
(i) the maximum ratio of voting rights for the 'enhanced' shares versus ordinary shares is 20:1. This means that a founder shareholder will need to hold at least 4.7% of the issued share capital in order to block an ordinary resolution and effectively maintain control of an issuer – if an issuer has been through multiple series of investment rounds prior to IPO, this may have diluted a founder director below such a threshold;
(ii) the enhanced voting rights may only apply in respect of resolutions relating to (i) the removal of the founder as a director and (ii) any vote following a change of control i.e. a takeover. In practice, this means that the level of protection provided to a founder director is extremely limited. This is in contrast to the US and some of the above standard listing examples, where the 'golden share' and other dual class structures are well-established and investors are comfortable with founder directors retaining significant control over a company post-listing; and
(iii) these rights must have a 'sunset' provision whereby they expire 5 years from the date of listing.
The FCA has been trying to find a 'Goldilocks' approach; however it remains to be seen whether these changes are sufficiently balanced. It also remains to be seen whether the FCA will amend the rules further at a later date. The FCA has stated that it will, "engage further with market participants to discuss specific issues and ideas raised."
Some key questions remain to be determined in practice:
- Will the change be significant enough to entice founder-led businesses to list on the premium segment of the London Stock Exchange rather than e.g. a standard listing or the US, where a dual class structure is both less restrictive and more widely accepted?
- Will these changes be unpalatable for other institutional investors? Whilst much of the commentary around UK listing reforms has focused on reducing what some see as regulatory burden, one of the many reasons that the UK is well-supported by a strong investor base is the empowered regulatory oversight, governance and disclosure requirements.
- Will the FTSE and other market index producers accept dual class structured issuers into their indices? If so, what impact will this have on passive investors (who invest in tracker funds)?